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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a Semi-Markov Process (SMP) model of
an Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain. We develop the
steady state probability equations by first examining the embedded
Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) sojourn times. Based on
published reports of ICS vulnerabilities and an actual case study of
a cyber-attack on a number of power stations on the Ukraine power
grid, we derive the parameter values for our SMP model. Using
these values, we calculate the steady state probabilities of the model
and provide insights on the results particularly on the top two ICS
security attributes: availability and integrity.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
• Security and privacy~Formal security models

General Terms
Measurement, Performance, Security, Theory

Keywords
Industrial Control Systems, SCADA, ICS Kill Chain, Stochastic
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1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been widely employed to
supervise and control critical infrastructures in various sectors such
as supplying and/or controlling essential energy, water treatment,
transport, chemicals, and disparate manufacturing processes. ICS
typically consist of a combination of software, hardware and
operators. The most common components found in ICS are
Systems Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Distributed
Control Systems (DCS) and Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLC).
ICS are originally designed as air-gapped networks, but have now
become increasingly interconnected with other IT systems and
external networks. Whilst offering efficient communication and
high throughput, such evolution has also exposed ICS to a growing
number of malicious cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks on ICS could
result in unexpected disruption to controlling critical infrastructures
and bring harmful physical damage to all living creatures and the
environment. There were 245 cyber-attacks on ICS that were
reported to ICS-CERT in 2014 [16]; 295 incidents were reported in
2015 [17].

Stuxnet was disclosed in 2010 as the first cyber weapon causing
havoc to a large nuclear plant in Iran. Until September 2010,
Stuxnet infected approximately 100,000 hosts across over 155
countries. Two more recent examples are the security breach to a
German steel mill causing massive damage to the whole plant in
2014 [18] and the cyber-attack against Ukrainian power companies
in 2015 leading to power outage and affecting approximately
225,000 customers[6]. Currently the cyber security of ICS has
become an increasing concern for government, industry and
academia all over the world.
In this paper, we propose a stochastic model to formally express the
complete life-cycle of an ICS-targeted attack. We follow the key
phases of the ICS Kill Chain [2], which are then formally
represented as a Semi-Markov Chain process. The key contribution
of this paper is a novel formal model of an ICS Kill Chain which
can be used to derive key security and performance indicators for
system integrity, resiliency, survivability, availability, and failure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the ICS Kill Chain
and a brief introduction to stochastic modeling are described in
section 1; section 2 introduces the transition model of the ICS Kill
Chain; section 3 shows the formal semi-Markov model and the
development of its steady state equations; section 4 presents the
derivation of the parameters values; and finally, in section 5, we
provide concluding remarks and some future research directions.

1.1 Industrial Control Systems Kill Chain
In [2], an Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain is introduced.
This model is adopted from the seminal work by Hutchins, Cloppert
and Amin [4] on Cyber Kill Chain™. The Cyber Kill Chain™ is
patterned after the military concept of kill chains to gain a better
understanding of the adversary’s campaign. To better appreciate
the relationship between the original Cyber Kill Chain™ and the
ICS Kill Chain, we superimposed them in Figures 1, 2, and 3. A
description of each phase is attributed to Assante and Lee [2].

1.1.1 Stage One
Planning Phase. In this phase reconnaissance is performed to
gauge the strength of the system defenses as well as gather
information that may be used to create attack vectors. In ICS, it may
also include researching specific control system vulnerabilities that
are endemic to the type of infrastructure that is of interest.
Preparation Phase. This phase will include weaponization or
targeting. While weaponization involves the crafting of seemingly
innocuous files with exploit code to facilitate the advancement of

the malicious objective, targeting is the process of prioritizing
targets and matching harmful actions that are appropriate to those
targets.

Let X(t) be a discrete-state stochastic process and let
Pr(X(tn) = j) be the probability that the process is in state
j at the time tn. X(t) is a Markov chain if, for any ordered
times t1 < t2 < … <tn , the conditional probability of being
in any state j such as that Pr {X(tn) = j | X(tn-1) = in-1, X(t0)
= i0} = Pr{X(tn) = j| X(tn-1) = in-1 }.

Cyber Intrusion Phase. This phase includes the Delivery step,
which is used to induce interaction with the system or the user; the
Exploit step, which is the process of gaining unauthorized access to
the system; the Install step, wherein the adversary installs
applications such as backdoors to be able to gain unimpeded access
to the system; and the Modify step, wherein the adversary changes
the system environment using existing tools such as PowerShell to
be able to escalate system privileges.

Essentially, it asserts that any state depends on the state
immediately prior to it and cannot depend on any state before that
prior state.

Management and Enablement Phase. In this phase, the adversary
establishes command and control (C2) using the tools and
applications that were successfully installed or built in the previous
phase. More often than not, the established C2 will be configured

In real cyber-attack events, the sojourn time in a particular state
may not at all be exponentially distributed but may be described by
any arbitrary distribution function. Thus, we use a semi-Markov
process in which the rate of transition from one state to another may
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with stealth communication features to prevent detection.
Sustainment, Entrenchment, Development, and Execution.
This phase is when malicious actions start to take place. Covert
capture of user credentials, lateral movement, data collection and
exfiltration, installation of advanced tools, and anti-forensic
activities are initiated.

1.1.2 Stage Two
Attack Development and Tuning. This phase may take longer
than the other phases. This is the time in which the adversary would
take time in developing the suitable attack method and tools based
on the exfiltrated data gathered during the previous phases.
Validation Phase. This is when the attacker would test the
developed capabilities on a similar system. Activities in this phase
would reveal the extent of how much the attack could inflict on the
target system.
ICS Attack. In this step, the capability is delivered, installed, and
executed.

1.2 Stochastic Modelling
A stochastic model expresses the uncertainty of security posture
due to incomplete knowledge by actors on both sides: the adversary
and the system designer or operator. In developing the model,
probabilities and cumulative distribution functions are used to
describe the events that trigger transitions to different states.
1.2.1 Markov Chain
The application of Markov chain model requires the stochastic
process to be discretized into a number of states and determining
the transition probabilities between two states. In [19], a formal
definition of a Markov chain is provided as follows:

depend on the sojourn time in the source state but not on anything
that happened prior to reaching that source state.
Because of the immense variety of attacks, an assortment of
distribution functions may need to be considered. In [8], Madan et
al. suggest the appropriate distribution function that is suited to a
specific threat situation as follows: a hypo-exponential distribution
to model transitions involving multi-stage activities and threat
situations that may cause monotonically increasing failure rate; a
hyper-exponential distribution function to model threats that
exhibit a monotonically decreasing failure rate; a Weibull
distribution function to model constant failure rate, a monotonically
increasing failure rate , or a monotonically decreasing failure rate;
and a log-logistic type of distribution function for a combination of
decreasing rate of success initially followed by an increasing rate
(or vice-versa)[7].

2 The State Transition Model for the ICS Kill
Chain
Using the ICS Kill Chain as a basis, we derive a state transition
model as shown in Figure 4. Each node represents a state which
may comprise of one or more steps on the kill chain. The labelled
arcs represent a transition between states. This model will later be
transformed into a formal Semi-Markov process chain with steadystate and transition probabilities.
The Normal state, G, represents a condition in which the ICS is in
normal operating condition. The transition to the Detect state, D,
denotes the detection/notification of abnormal system behavior, a
system patch, or firmware update which may or may not cause any
disruption. At some point in time, the ICS transitions to the Recon
state, R, this is the first step on the ICS Kill Chain.
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Thus, the prospect of bringing back the system to the Attack state
is enabled.

R(Recon)

PR

Planning&Prep

1-PR

D(Detect/Mitigate)

1- PA

Detection/patching

F(Fail)

PF

C(Cyber Intrusion)
Cyber intrusion
mgt/enablement
entrenchment

3 SEMI-MARKOV PROCESS MODELLING
Formally, we describe the Semi-Markov Process (SMP) as follows:
Let {X(t) : t ≥ 0} be the base stochastic process with a set of discrete
state space Xs={A, C, D, F, G, R} with sojoun time distributions, Hi(t)
and parameters: hi , as the sojourn time in state i ϵ Xs and the
transition probabilities pij between states i and j, where i, j ϵ Xs. At
the instants of state transitions, a semi-Markov chain behaves like
a Markov chain. Hence, at those instants we have an embedded
discrete-parameter Markov chain [10].

A(Attack)
Attack Dev
Validation

Table 1 The ICS Kill Chain Semi-Markov Model Parameters

Figure 4 The State Transition Diagram for the ICS Kill Chain

hA

Mean time for the ICS to stay in the state of being
attacked

The Recon state, R, embodies the reconnaissance, planning,
weaponization and/or targeting phase of the chain. If one or more
these activities are detected, the model transitions to the Detect
state, D. An example of such transition occurs when a network
mapping or a persistent port knocking activity is discovered.
Alternatively, the transition will take it to the Cyber Intrusion
state, C.

hC

Mean time for the ICS to remain in a
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Mean time for the ICS to remain in detection,
mitigation, and repair state
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Mean time for the ICS to remain in the failed
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Mean time for the ICS to stay in a normal state
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In the Cyber Intrusion state, C, the delivery of weaponized
documents is made, the command and control system is enabled,
and the enhancement of system control and familiarization is
accomplished through lateral movements and credential harvesting.
A transition to the Detect state, D, is made when an activity
associated with cyber intrusion is detected. Alternatively, the
adversary may decide to enter the attack phase of the kill chain.
This is represented by the transition to the Attack state, A, of the
model.
In the Attack state, A, the activities of the adversary may not all
happen on the targeted ICS system. With sophisticated or statesponsored adversaries, the development and validation of the
system tools may be conducted at remote systems that mimic the
actual target. We assume that some of the activities in this phase
will be conducted at the target ICS system infrastructure. When
such activity is detected, the model shifts to the Detect state, D.
Again, an alternative will take it to the Failed state, F.
The Failed state, F, represents the condition when the full
capability of the adversary is delivered, installed, and executed. We
assume that the time spent in this state will be minimal as shown
by published accounts of several attacks on ICS environment.
However, the consequences are far reaching and expensive. After a
short time in the state, the model transitions to the Detect state, D,
for repair, recovery, and other incident response measures.
The Detect state, D, is a transition destination of five states: G, R,
C, A, and F. Essentially, when an abnormal or malicious activity
is detected in one of those states, the transition to leave the state is
activated. Aside from detection, the repair, patching, recovery and
other incident handling activities are performed at this state. Note
the existence of a transition from this state back to the Attack state,
A. This transition embodies the fact that patches and other
immediate mitigation tools may not be immediately available.
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Using a similar analysis on the semi-Markov process found in [10],
we compute the steady state probability vector [A, C, D, F, G ,
R] by first computing, for each state, the mean sojourn time
∞

ℎ𝑖 = ∫ (1 − 𝐻𝑖 (𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡
0

Next we find the steady state A, C, D, F, G , R] for the
embedded discrete-parameter Markov chain by solving the linear
system of Equations:
x P
x e = 1 or simply ∑𝒊 𝜸𝒊 = 1, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝑅}

(1)

Where P is the discrete Markov-chain probability matrix and e =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)T . Finally, we can compute the steady-state
probabilities for the SMP using

𝜋𝑖 =

𝛾𝑖 × ℎ𝑖
∑𝑗 𝛾𝑗 × ℎ𝑗

∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝑅}

where the semi-Markov transition is from state j to state i. For a
detailed derivation of the preceding equations, the interested reader
is referred to the works of Sahner [10] and Trivedi [19].
The parameters for the SMP are enumerated in Table 1. The
transition probability matrix P describes the state transition
probabilities between the embedded DTMC states shown in Figure
4. The steady-state probabilities of the DTMC, [A, C, D, F, G,
R, M], are calculated using the following system of linear equations
from (1):
𝛾𝐴 = 𝛾𝐶 𝑃𝐴 + 𝛾𝐷 𝑃𝑈
𝛾𝐶 = 𝛾𝑅 𝑃𝐶
𝛾𝐷 = 𝛾𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝐶 ) + 𝛾𝐶 (1 − 𝑃𝐴 ) + 𝛾𝐺 (1 − 𝑃𝑅 ) + 𝛾𝐴 (1 − 𝑃𝐹 ) + 𝐹
𝛾𝐹 = 𝛾𝐴 𝑃𝐹
𝛾𝐺 = 𝛾𝐷 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 )
𝛾𝑅 = 𝛾𝐺 𝑃𝑅
𝛾𝐴 + 𝛾𝐶 + 𝛾𝐷 + 𝛾𝐹 + 𝛾𝐺 + 𝛾𝑅 = 1

(Equations 3-9)

Solving for the steady-state probabilities of the DTMC in terms of
the transition probabilities using Matlab®’s Symbolic Math
Toolbox [9] yields equations (10)-(15) as shown in the Appendix.
Using equations (10)-(15), we can now calculate the SMP steadystate probability for each state. Henceforth, equations (16)-(21), as
shown in the Appendix, are derived.

3.2 Passage Time Analysis
Another measure of interest is that on passage-time distributions. A
passage time is a random variable describing the amount of time it
takes to reach a state j, given that the process starts in states i.
Hence, for the analysis we must assume that target state j is an
absorbing state, i.e. states with no outgoing transitions, so that we
actually stop measuring the time of a trajectory once we reached
the target state. From passage-time distributions we can derive
metrics such as mean time to detection (MTTD) which is the
average passage time from the Normal state, G, to the Detect state,
D. Mean time to compromise (MTTC) is the average passage time
from Normal state, G, to Compromise state, C. Mean time to failure
(MTTF) is the average passage time from Normal state, G, to Fail
state, F. Mean time to recover (MTTR) is the average passage time
from Compromise state, C, to Normal state, G. In section 4.4, we
present the results of computing the passage-time distributions by
gathering samples from multiple simulation runs.

4 DERIVING PARAMETER VALUES
In order to create a model that will represent the system as
realistically as possible, we derive values for the sojourn time value
for each state i and provide justification based on an actual event
and other published reports.

4.1 The Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid: A
Case Study
In December, 2015 a regional electricity distribution company in
Ukraine was subjected to a cyber-attack resulting in several power
outages that lasted for three hours [6]. The Industrial Control
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) cited
public reports that the BlackEnergy (BE) malware was found on
the companies’ network but would not confirm its role in the attack
[5].

The Ukrainian Power Grid (UPG) cyber-attack demonstrated an
adversary that is extremely capable and highly resourced. Several
evidence materials point to the fact that the adversary has been
conducting long-term planning and reconnaissance, lasting at least
six months [13], to be able to execute a highly coordinated and
effective attack. Among the technical components used by the
adversary are spear phishing, theft of credentials, use of Virtual
Private Networks (VPN), use of remote access tools to manipulate
Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), firmware level disruption of
devices, utilization of KillDisk , and telephone denial-of-service
[6]. The ICS Kill Chain mapping to the UPG cyber-attack is well
articulated in [6] and is recapitulated in the following:
The Reconnaissance in stage 1 took place at least six months
before the actual attack. Evidence reveals that this is a directed
attack and that the levels of automation on the distribution systems
made them attractive targets.
In the Weaponization and/or Targeting step at stage 1, the
adversary crafted Microsoft Office documents with embedded
BlackEnergy malware as attack vectors.
During the Cyber Intrusion step at stage 1, the weaponized
documents were delivered to individuals working in the
administrative and IT sectors of the companies. When the
documents were opened, the embedded macros were unleashed
which enabled the installation of the BlackEnergy malware. The
malware facilitated the command and control communication
between the adversary at a remote site and the infected systems
within the companies’ premises. It is also at this step when
credentials were harvested and lateral movement within the IT
infrastructure was carried-out.
The Develop step in stage 2 occurred mostly within the adversary
environment to minimize detection. This step included the design
and implementation of malicious tools, both software and
firmware, to gain control of the Distribution Management Systems
(DMS) and the serial-to-ethernet devices. The Validation step in
stage 2 was conducted on the adversary site to evaluate and test the
malicious tools before the actual attack. These fine-tuned malicious
tools were then delivered to the compromised systems before the
execution of the actual attack.
During the last step of the ICS Kill Chain, the ICS Attack, the
adversary utilized the HMIs to manipulate the breakers in the
SCADA environment. This opening of breakers enabled 27
substations to be taken offline causing power interruption to more
than 225,000 customers. At the same time, the malicious firmware
was uploaded to the serial-to-ethernet devices and thereby disabling
them for remote control. To exacerbate the situation, a telephonic
denial of service on the companies’ call centers was initiated to
prevent customers from contacting customer support. The entire
Kill Chain operation transpired commencing in March 2015 until
December 2015.
The purpose of describing the above case study is to provide the
reader a grasp of the timeline in which each of the steps in the Kill
Chain has occurred. The discussion also facilitates a segue to the
derivation of the values for the DTMC sojourn times.

4.2 Industrial Control Systems Vulnerability Statistics
In a 2016 report, Kaspersky lab published a report [1] indicating
that there are a total of 189 vulnerabilities in ICS components in
2015. Out of this total number of vulnerabilities, 26 have associated

exploits. The report also includes an alarming statistic that patches
and/or new firmware are available to only 85% of the published
vulnerabilities. Of the remaining 15%, five percent were partially
fixed, two percent were unpatched and removed, three percent were
unpatched and declared obsolete and five percent remained
unpatched. Using this data and using Polityuk’s model [11], we
calculate a mean sojourn time in the Compromised (C) state of our
SMP model to be 24 hours.

Table 3. Transition Probabilities of the SMP
Transition
Probability

Description

Value

PA

Probability of
being attacked

0.70

Miscellaneous
published reports

PC

Probability of
being
compromised

0.10

Estimated using the
Analysis of the
“Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power
Grid” [6].

PF

Probability of
failure

0.15

Estimated using the
“Analysis of the
Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power
Grid” [6] and the
2016 Kaspersky lab
report [1].

PR

Probability of
being targeted

0.99

Estimated using the
“Analysis of the
Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power
Grid “ [6].

PU

Probability of
an
unmitigated/unrepaired
vulnerability

0.05

Estimated using the
Analysis of the
“Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power
Grid” [6].

4.3 The Parameter Values
Tables 2 and 3 depict a summary of our findings.

Sojourn
Time

Table 2. The Mean Sojourn Time
Description
Value
Source
(days)
Mean time for
the ICS to stay
in the state of
being attacked

180

hC

Mean time for
the ICS to
remain in a
compromised
position

1

McQueen’s model
[11] and data from
Kaspersky lab report
[1]

hD

Mean time for
the ICS to
remain in
detection/mitiga
tion/patching
state

54

2016 Cost of Cyber
Crime Study & the
Risk of Business
Innovation [14]

hA

hF

hG

hR

Mean time for
the ICS to
remain in the
failed state

0.125

Mean time for
the ICS to stay
uncompromised
in the presence
of vulnerability

365

Mean time for
the ICS to stay
in the
reconnaissance,
planning, and
preparation state

90

Actual duration of
attack (6 months) as
reported in the
“Analysis of the
Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power
Grid” [6].

4.4 Interpretation of Results
Using the derived steady-state equations (16)-(21) for the SMP and
the data gathered in Tables 2 and 3, we calculated the following
steady state probabilities:

Actual duration of
failure reported on the
“Analysis of the
Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power Grid
“ [6].

A = 0.03912
C = 0.000176
D = 0.10132
F = 0.00000176
G = 0.68481

Estimated as 365
days.

Estimated based on
the report “Analysis
of the Cyber Attack
on the Ukrainian
Power Grid” [6].

Source

R = 0.1588113
Furthermore, we also obtained from the simulations of passage time
distributions the following results: MTTD = 459±7,
MTTC=5117±99, MTTF=29009±555, MTTR=194±3 with 95%
confidence interval using 10,000 simulation runs.
Based on the above results, we provide the following observations:
a.

b.

c.

The steady state probability values suggest the dominant
stay of the ICS in the Normal (G), Recon (R) and Detect
(D) states. This result clearly validates the Ukraine Power
Grid report [6].
The almost negligible probability and yet, highly
consequential effect, of being in the failed state indicates
a highly sophisticated adversary that can produce a
significant loss within a short duration.
The System Availability, calculated as 1-F = 0.999996,
remains at a high level despite the fact that the ICS is, at
times, in compromised and attack states. The metric

d.

5

indicates the level with which the system is delivering its
mission free from degradation or impairment.
The System Integrity, calculated as G + R = 0.8436,
indicates a good amount of time that the system is
performing its intended functions without being
compromised or manipulated.
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CONCLUSIONS and FUTURE WORKS

A stochastic model of an industrial control system Kill Chain is
designed and applied using parameter values derived from data
gathered from an actual case study and currently available
published reports. Using the results that were gleaned from
calculations using equations derived from the model, we were able
to produce the following important ICS security and performance
metrics: system availability, system integrity, MTTF, MTTD,
MTTC, and MTTR.
A meta-model of cyber physical system attacks referred to as a
cyber-physical kill-chain is introduced in [3]. It would be an
interesting extension to this study the application of the SMP model
to that cyber-physical chain. Further, we recognize that the
stochastic model described above requires additional validation
using empirical data and robust simulation. Thus, we offer the
following future research directions:
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Perform a sensitivity analysis on the model using various
sets of parameter values;



Continue to gather data from actual field reports and use
those to validate the model; and



Design and implement computer simulations to study the
effect of various distribution functions on the model.
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8 APPENDIX

Equations (10-15):

𝛾𝐺 =

1 − 𝑃𝑈
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝛾𝑅 =

𝑃𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 )
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝛾𝐶 =

𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 )
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝛾𝐴 =

𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝛾𝐹 =

𝑃𝐹 [𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈 ]
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝛾𝐷 =

1
2 + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝑈 [𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑅 ] + 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 [1 + 𝑃𝐹 − 𝑃𝑈 − 𝑃𝐹 𝑃𝑈 ]

Equations (16-21):

𝜋𝐺 =

ℎ𝐺 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ]
ℎ𝐷 + ℎ𝐺 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ] + ℎ𝑅 𝑃𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 )+ℎ𝐶 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 ) + ℎ𝐴 [𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈 ] + ℎ𝐹 𝑃𝐹 [𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈 ]

𝜋𝐶 =

𝜋𝐴 =

ℎ𝑐 [𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 (1 − 𝑃𝑈 )]𝜋𝐺
ℎ𝐺

ℎ𝐴 [𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈 ]𝜋𝐺
ℎ𝐺

𝜋𝐷 =

𝜋𝐹 =

ℎ𝐷 𝜋𝐺
ℎ𝐺

ℎ𝐹 𝑃𝐹 [𝑃𝑈 + 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝑈 ]𝜋𝐺
ℎ𝐺

𝜋𝑅 =

ℎ𝑅 𝑃𝑅 [1 − 𝑃𝑈 ]𝜋𝐺
ℎ𝐺

